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International law permits one state to use force against another state
only in certain narrowly defined situations. A state may use force in self-
defense in the event of an "armed attack" by another state. Additionally,
treaties may give a state the right to use force in designated situations.
Apart from these exceptions, however, the prohibition against the use of
force is quite strict.
In its December 1989 invasion of Panama, the United States asserted
both these grounds as legal justifications. It argued that it had been at-
tacked by Panama, and that its use of force was therefore defensive. It
also claimed that Panama had violated bilateral treaties regulating the
Panama Canal, and that those treaties gave the United States the right to
use force against the government of Panama. This article explores the
validity of these two asserted legal justifications for the United States
actions in Panama.
I. Factual Background
In December 1989 the United States, using troops stationed both in
Panama and in the United States, attacked and defeated the Panamanian
Defense Forces (P.D.F.), removed the existing government of Panama,
and installed a group that had been the apparent victors in elections held
earlier that year. The United States justified its action on two grounds:
(1) that it was defending United States personnel against attacks by Pan-
ama; and (2) that Panama had interfered with the operation of the Pan-
ama Canal, giving the United States a right to intervene under treaties
regulating the Canal. United States officials also identified two additional
objectives of the invasion: (1) the restoration of democracy in Panama;
and (2) the seizure of General Manuel Noriega, the head of Panama's
government, in order to try him on drug trafficking charges. Congress
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reacted favorably to the invasion, but some legal scholars challenged the
action as a violation of international law.'
The invasion occurred against a backdrop of escalating confrontation
between Panama and the United States. A major element in the tension
was the Panama Canal, which the United States was in the process of
transferring to Panamanian control. The Canal Zone has a long and con-
troversi.l history. Following the refusal of Colombia's Senate in 1903 to
approve a treaty2 for the right to Construct a canal across the Panama-
nian isthmus,3 which was then part of Colombia, the United States en-
couraged a revolt against the Colombian government in the isthmus 4 and
used its navy to hold Colombia's navy at bay.5 The United States then
concluded with Panama the Isthmian Canal Convention,6 which gave the
United States the rights it would have "if it were the sovereign" in what
came to be called the Canal Zone, "to the entire exclusion of the exercise
by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or au-
thority."' 7 The United States constructed the Canal through the Zone ter-
ritory, a ten mile wide strip in which the United States also established
governmental institutions and set up military bases that became the
center of operations for the United States military in Latin America. 8
Following the 1964 civil disorders in the Canal Zone, which were
sparked by nationalist sentiment and popular discontent with the status
of the Zone,9 and a 1973 United Nations Security Council draft resolu-
tion - vetoed by the United States - urging the United States and Pan-
ama to negotiate a new Canal treaty, 10 Panama and the United States
1. U.S. Cites Self-Defense Legal Scholars Skeptical, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A36,
col. 3; see also Letter to President George Bush, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at A28, col. 1.
2. Convention on Construction of a Ship Canal, Jan. 22, 1903, United States-Colombia, 3
UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1976 447 (C. Wiktor
ed. 1977).
3. A. URIBE, COLOMBIA, ESTADOS UNDOS Y PANAMA 90-98 (1976); 2 G. CAVELER, LA
POLfrICA INTERNACIONAL DE. COLOMBIA 305-07 (1960).
4. A. URIBE, supra note 3, at 103-05; 2 G. CAVELIER, supra note 3, at 308-09.
5.' 3 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (1906); A. URIBE, supra note 3, at
105; M. ARTEAGA HERNANDEZ & J. ARTEAGA CARVAJAL, HISToRIA POLITICA DE COLOM-
BIA 502 (1986); D. HOWARTH, PANAMA 235 (1966).
6. Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431.
7. Id. art. 3.
8. See generally Panama: Troubled Passage for a U.S. Ally, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1981, at
F79, col. 3 (discussing strategic importance and role of bases in Panama); 18 U.S.C. § 3241
(1989) (providing jurisdiction for U.S. District Court in Canal Zone).
9. See T. WElL, J. BLACK, H. BLuTSTEIN, D. McMoRRis, F. MuNsON & C. TOWNSEND,
AREA HANDBOOK FOR PANAMA 232 (1977); Editorial Comment, LegalAspects of the Panama
Case, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 436, 437 (1964); Panama Suspends U.S. Tie and Charges Aggression
After Riot in Canal Zone, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1964, at Al, col. 8.
10. Draft Res., 28 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1973) at 58, U.N. Doc. S/10931/Rev.1
(1973) ("[u]rges the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Pan-
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concluded new treaties regarding the Canal in 1977. The Panama Canal
Treaty11 abrogated the Isthmian Canal Convention.1 2 According to its
terms, the United States was to dismantle its governmental institutions in
the Canal Zone immediately1 3 and phase out its control over the Canal.1 4
Final transfer of the Canal to Panama was to occur on December 31,
1999.15 By a separate but simultaneous treaty, the Treaty Concerning the
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,1 6 Panama
and the United States agreed that the Canal would remain open perma-
nently to the shipping of all states.
In 1983 General Manuel Noriega became the head of the Panamanian
military and the de facto head of Panama's government. General
Noriega, who had for some years supplied intelligence information to the
United States, cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Administration in
efforts to stop the importing of cocaine into the United States from South
America; at the same time, however, the United States received informa-
tion that General Noriega was facilitating drug smuggling into the
United States.' 7 General Noriega also cooperated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in supporting the Nicaraguan rebels (contras); in particu-
lar, he helped the C.I.A. open a "southern front" for the contras in Costa
Rica. 18 When that cooperation broke down, the U.S.-Noriega relation-
ship began to deteriorate.' 9
ama to continue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, mutual respect and co-operation
and to conclude without delay a new treaty aimed at the prompt elimination of the causes of
conflict between them"); 28 U.N. SCOR (1704th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1704 (1973).
11. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. 39, T.I.A.S.
No. 10030, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1022 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Panama Canal Treaty].
12. Id. art. 1.
13. Id art. 3(10).
14. Id. art. 3(8).
15. Id art. 2(2).
16. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,
Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10029, reprinted in 16 LL.M.
1040 (1977) [hereinafter Neutrality Treaty].
17. Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y. Times, June
12, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
18. Id. (Administration officials say Noriega provided C.I.A. with sensitive information
regarding Nicaragua and helped U.S. combat insurgencies in Central America.); A man, a
plan, a canal, Panama, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990, at 17 (stating that Gen. Noriega "for years
worked with and for the United States (helping in, among other things, the contras' fight for
Nicaragua)"); Papers Seized from Noriega Could Help Iran-Contra Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1990, at A16, col. 1 (1985 agreement for contras to train in Panama); Officials Say Bush Heard
'85 Charge Against Noriega, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988, at Al, ol. 4.
19. Eagleburger, The OAS and the Panama Crisis, 89 DEPT ST. BULL. 67, 72 (Nov. 1989).
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In 1988, General Noriega was indicted on charges of facilitating co-
caine imports into the United States.20 The United States also en-
couraged Panamanian military officers to overthrow General Noriega. 21
To pressure General Noriega to relinquish power, President Bush froze
Panamanian government assets in the United States 22 and forbade U.S.
citizens and companies from making payments (including tax payments)
to the Panamanian government. 23
In 1989 the United States criticized General Noriega for violating civil
rights in Panama, and in particular for nullifying the results of a May
1989 presidential election in which an opposition group headed by Guil-
lermo Endara was the apparent victor.24 The Organization of American
States was also critical of General Noriega and urged him to cede power
to a civilian administration. 25 The Central Intelligence Agency aided a
Panamanian military force that formed in neighboring Costa Rica to
overthrow General Noriega.
26
The tension between the United States and Panama escalated. In Au-
gust 1989, the United States complained to the United Nations Security
Council that Panama's government had harassed United State. military
personnel and intimidated civilian personnel operating the Canal.27 In
20. Noriega Indicted by US. for Links to Illegal Drugs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at Al,
col. 6 (one indictment in Miami, one in Tampa); Eagleburger, supra note 19, at 70-71 (Acting
Secretary of State describing charges at Aug. 24, 1989 O.A.S. meeting).
21. US. Withholds a Canal Payment in New Steps to Oust Panamanian, N.Y. Times, Mar.
12, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
22. Exec. Order No. 12,635, 31 C.F.R. §§ 565.201-.206 (1988), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701, at 271 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Executive Order]; U.S. Withholds a Canal Payment in
New Steps to Oust Panamanian, supra note 21; U.S. Orders Private Citizens to Halt Payments to
Panama, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 5; Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 573 (1988).
23. Executive Order, supra note 22; U.S. Orders Private Citizens to Halt Payments to Pan-
ama, supra note 22; Leich, supra note 22, at 573; see also Eagleburger, supra note 19, at 74. In
February 1988 the Panamanian National Assembly removed the President from office; never-
theless, the U.S. recognized him, rather than the factual leadership, as the government of Pan-
ama and directed that payments be made to accounts controlled by him.
24. Noriega Stealing Election, Carter Says, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Bush
Urges Effort to Press Noriega to Quit as Leader, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at Al, col. 6;
Transcript of Bush's News Conference on the Panama Vote, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at A10,
col. 1; Hemispheric Group Asks Noriega to Yield Power, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1989, at A8, col.
3 (O.A.S. charges election abuses).
25. O.A.S. Draws Latin Fire for Stand on Panama, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1989, at AI0, col.
1; Latin Envoys Report No Progress in Their Effort to Dislodge Noriega, N.Y. Times, June 20,
1989, at A8, col. 1; Diplomats Urge Noriega to Resign by Sept 1, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1989, at
A6, col. 4; Diplomacy: Haunting Noriega Issue Stirs Great Hope and Low Expectation as
O.A.S. Meets Again, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1989, at A20, col. 5; U.S. Is Faulted on Military
Maneuvers in Panama, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
26. Avirgan, Panama Contras?, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 1989, at 263-65; An Untold Guer-
rilla War: Noriega Foes Rule Border, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at A8, col. 5.
27. Panama, United States Again Before Council, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 20 (Dec.
1989).
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the same month, the United States military conducted maneuvers of its
troops stationed in Panama.28 Further, the Department of State declared
that it would not accept any candidate for Canal Administrator ap-
pointed by the Panamanian government, 29 even though the 1977 Panama
Canal Treaty provided that a Panamanian was to replace a United States
national as Administrator on January 1, 1990.30 The government of Pan-
ama viewed this pressure by the United States as interference in Pan-
ama's internal affairs and as an indication that the United States might
renege on its treaty obligation to transfer control of the Canal to Panama.
It complained about the maneuvers to the Security Council, portraying
them as an attempt to intimidate Panama.
3 1
In September 1989, when the newly-installed government took office,
the United States refused to recognize it and suspended the importation
of Panamanian sugar.32 In October, the United States played a role in
encouraging an unsuccessful military coup against General Noriega;33 in
November, the United States military made serious contingency plans to
invade Panama. Moreover, on November 30, the United States added an
additional economic sanction, refusing to permit Panamanian-registered
ships to dock at U.S. ports.34 Since Panama gained significant revenue by
allowing ships to use Panamanian registry as a "flag of convenience,"
this action dealt a major blow to Panama's economy. 35
In response to this sanction, on December 15, 1989, the National As-
sembly of Panama adopted a resolution stating that Panama and the
United States were "in a state of war."'36 The following day, P.D.F
soldiers shot and killed a U.S. military officer in Panama City. On De-
cember 17, the United States decided to invade Panama.37 On December
20 it carried out the invasion, forcing General Noriega from power and
28. U.S. Is Faulted on Military Maneuvers in Panama, supra note 25.
29. Aide to Noriega Is Sworn In; U.S. Won't Recognize Him, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1989, at
A3, col. 5.
30. 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(3)(c).
31. Panama, United States Again Before Council, supra note 27; Panama Urges U.N. to
Send Observers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1989, at A3, col. 4.
32. U.S. Severs Diplomatic Contact with Noriega Regime, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL, 69 (Nov.
1989) (President's Statement of Sept. 1, 1989); Economic Measures Against Panama, 89 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 69 (Nov. 1989) (Department Statement of Sept. 12, 1989); U.S. Expands Its Sanc-
tions Against Panama, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
33. Bush Aides Admit a US. Role in Coup, and Bad Handling,'N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989,
at Al, col. 6.
34. US Imposes Ban on Ships under Panamanian Flag, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1989, at B2, Col.
5.
35. Rivals Try to Flag Down Panama Ship Business, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, at A8, col.
1.
36. Noriega Appointed 'Maximum Leader", Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1989, at A21, col. 1.
37. Excerpts From Briefing on U.S. Military Action in Panama, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989,
at A20, col. 1.
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facilitating the installation of Guillermo Endara as president but remain-
ing for the time being in military occupation of Panama.38
The United States, as indicated, put forward only two legal bases for
the invasion. In statements to the United Nations and to the Organiza-
tion of American States, the Department of State said that these bases
were: (1) self-defense; and (2) protection of the Panama Canal.39 While it
is possible that neither was the motivating factor behind the invasion, the
invasion would be lawful nonetheless if either reason provides a justifica-
tion under applicable principles of international law. This article pro-
ceeds next to analyze these two asserted justifications. It then addresses
the two additional objectives cited by the United States but not asserted
as legal justifications: the promotion of democracy in Panama, and the
arrest of General Noriega in order to prosecute him on drug trafficking
charges.
II. The Claim of Self-Defense
The first of the United States legal justifications was self-defense,
which it claimed on three bases: (1) that the National Assembly had de-
clared war on the United States on December 15; (2) that the December
16 shooting was an attack on the United States; and (3) that paramilitary
elements affiliated with the Panamanian government were planning to
attack United States civilians in Panama.
A. Declaration by Panama of a State of War
On December 15, the Panama National Assembly adopted a resolution
stating: "It is declared that the Republic of Panama is in a state of war
while there is aggression against the people of Panama from the United
States of America." 4 "Aggression" referred to the United States eco-
nomic sanctions and recent military maneuvers.41 The resolution was a
reaction to United States pressure, which most recently had been intensi-
fied by the declaration of a new policy of forbidding Panamanian-regis-
tered vessels to dock in United States ports.4 2 By the same resolution, the
38. U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control in Panama; New Leaders Put In But Noriega Gets
Away, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
39. BUREAU OF PUB. AP'F., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 1240, PANAMA:
A JUST CAUSE 1 (1990) [hereinafter PANAMA: A JUST CAUSE] (statement of T. Pickering,
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations); id at 3 (statement of L. Einaudi, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.).
40. U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control in Panama; New Leaders Put In But Noriega Gets
Away, supra note 38, at A18, col. 3.
41. Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader", supra note 36; Noriega's "State of War" Seen
as Quest for Backing, Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1989, at A32, col. 1.
42. US Imposes Ban on Ships under Panamanian Flag, supra note 34.
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National Assembly appointed General Noriega as the "chief of govern-
ment" and as the "maximum leader of national liberation" to deal with
the situation created by the "state of war." 43 President Bush cited this
resolution as a factor that, among others, gave the United States a right
to intervene.44
B. December 16 Attack on U.S. Nationals
Administration officials also cited incidents of violence that occurred
in Panama City on December 16. A U.S. military officer, Marine Lieu-
tenant Robert Paz, was killed at a P.D.F. checkpoint near the P.D.F.
headquarters in Panama City.45 Four off-duty U.S. officers in an automo-
bile drove past the checkpoint, whereupon P.D.F. soldiers fired at them,
killing Lieutenant Paz. A P.D.F. communiqu6 claimed that the four
U.S. officers fired first, wounding two Panamanian civilians and one sol-
dier.46 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, however, the four
officers, unarmed, stopped at the checkpoint, having lost their way.
P.D.F. soldiers pointed weapons at them and reached into the car and
pulled at their clothing. Fearing for their safety, the officers drove
away.47 The P.D.F. soldiers fired immediately, killing Lieutenant Paz
and wounding another officer.
The Department of Defense also stated that a United States Navy of-
ficer and his wife witnessed this incident and were observed by other,
reportedly intoxicated, 48 P.D.F. soldiers, who took them into custody
and held them for four hours, during which time the soldiers questioned
them, beat the officer, and sexually threatened his wife.49
Leonardo Kam, Foreign Minister of Panama, called the checkpoint
incident "a grave escalation in the permanently hostile policy of provoca-
tion" of Panama by the U.S. military; President Bush labelled it an "out-
rage," and a White House spokesperson denounced it and the December
15 resolution, stating that they created a "climate of aggression." 50 Even
though the P.D.F. claimed that the U.S. personnel had been at fault in
43. Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader" supra note 36.
44. A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
45. Pair of Incidents Pushed Bush Toward Invasion, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1989, at A16,
col. 2.
46. U.S. Assails Panama in Killing of GI, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Presi-
dent Calls Panama Slaying a Great Outrage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
47. Excerpts From US. Account of Officer's Death in Panama, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1989,
at AS, col. 3.
48. Pair of Incidents Pushed Bush Toward Invasion, supra note 45.
49. Excerpts From U.S. Account of Officer's Death in Panama, supra note 47.
50. President Calls Panama Slaying a Great Outrage, supra note 46.
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the incident, P.D.F. personnel told U.S. officials that the checkpoint inci-
dent was an isolated and unintended one.51 This communication, while
short of an apology, suggested that the incident was not part of a plan to
attack U.S. personnel.
Explaining the intervention, President Bush said that he "took this
action only after reaching the conclusion that.., the lives of American
citizens were in grave danger."' 52 Secretary of State Baker said that the
decision to invade was made on December 17, the day following these
incidents.5 3 The White House statement announcing the intervention
linked the National Assembly's resolution to the December 16 incidents:
"Last Friday, Noriega declared a state of war with the United States.
The next day, the P.D.F. shot to death an unarmed American service-
man, wounded another, seized and beat another serviceman and sexually
threatened his wife. Under these circumstances, the President decided he
must act to prevent further violence."
'54
C. Possible Future Attacks on U.S. Citizens
Throughout 1988 and 1989, the United States had complained of har-
assment of U.S. military personnel by the P.D.F. It protested a Novem-
ber 1988 incident in which P.D.F. soldiers allegedly beat and threatened
to kill a noncommissioned officer after he parked a military vehicle in a
no-parking zone at the Panama City airport.55 In discussions before the
Organization of American States, the United States alleged harassment
since February 1988 of both U.S. personnel and Panamanian Canal
workers, but acknowledged in August 1989 that "[r]ecently this harass-
ment of canal workers and of our military personnel has diminished
notably." 5
6
The United States, in justifying the invasion as.necessary to protect its
nationals from continued harassment, cited these past incidents. Echo-
ing the 1988 and 1989 complaints, Ambassador Pickering described a
two-year "systematic campaign to harass and intimidate U.S. and Pana-
manian employees of the Panama Canal Commission and the U.S.
forces" and referred to hundreds of incidents of "provocative and intoler-
51. Id.
52. A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, supra note 44.
53. Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A19,
col. 3.
54. Text of Statement by Fitzwater, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A19, col. 2.
55. Beating in Panama Protested by US., N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at A8, col. 1.
56. Eagleburger, supra note 19, at 73.
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able behavior" which "reached a peak last Friday' 57 and "threatened
American and Panamanian lives as well as canal operations."58
President Bush also stated that General Noriega had "publicly
threatened the lives of Americans in Panama," 59 although the Adminis-
tration produced no firm evidence of such statements. 6° Secretary Baker
said that the U.S. had information that General Noriega was preparing
"an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential neigh-
borhood" in Panama City.61 Baker admitted, however, that he could not
prove that this information was reliable; furthermore, he indicated that it
had been received subsequent to December 17, and thus had not been
known at the time of the decision to invade.62 Thus, the acts on which
the United States relied in its self-defense argument were the December
15 National Assembly resolution, the December 16 incidents, and the
prior P.D.F. harassment of U.S. personnel.
III. Assessment of the Self-Defense Claim
Asserting that these incidents - the resolution of a "state of war' and
the killing of Lieutenant Paz - gave rise to an anticipation of further
attacks on U.S. nationals, the Bush Administration claimed that the
United States had a right to invade Panama under the doctrine of self-
defense. For instance, Secretary Baker said that the U.S. action was
57. For a discussion of the incidents of Dec. 16, 1989, see supra text accompanying notes
45-54.
58. PANAMA: A JUST CAUSE, supra note 39, at 2.
59. A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, supra note 44.
This claim was an apparent reference to a statement in a speech by General Noriega to the
National Assembly on December 15, at the session at which it resolved that Panama was in a
"state of war" with the United States. Noriega said, at one point, "We will sit by the canal and
watch the bodies of our enemies float by." Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader", supra note
36. Unnamed White House officials said that this statement was a factor in President Bush's
decision to invade. "It Will Only Get Worse," Bush Told Aides; Attacks on U.S. Servicemen
Were Key Factor in Decision, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A31, col. 5. Abraham Sofaer,
Legal Adviser to the Department of State, cited this statement as a threat against United States
nationals, saying that it was "extremely hostile and charged." Abraham Sofaer, Remarks at
American Society of International Law, Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. (84th ann. mtg.), in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Mar. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Remarks of Abraham Sofaer]. General Noriega made
this statement, however, in explaining that Panama would not disrupt shipping in the Canal, as
indicated by the fact that his next sentence was, "But we will never destroy the canal."
Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader", supra note 36. He was saying that the P.D.F. would
do whatever it could to protect the canal. He was not threatening imminent assaults on United
States nationals resident in Panama.
60. But see US-Panama Tensions High After Slaying of US Officer, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Dec. 19, 1989, at 6, col. I (unnamed member of Panama National Assembly says appropriate
policy is to "kill gringos").
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fully in accordance with international law. The United States, under inter-
national law, has an inherent right of self-defense, as recognized in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter,
which entitles us to take measures necessary to defend our military person-
nel, our United States nationals and U.S. installations. 63
The United States, however, asserted self-defense in the face of a
strong prohibition in international law against use of force by one state
against another. Under the United Nations Charter, states must settle
disputes by peaceful means" and may not use force "against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence" of other states.65 The Charter
provides that, by way of exception, force may be used in self-defense by a
state "if an armed attack occurs" against it.66
The states of the Western Hemisphere wrote an even stronger prohibi-
tion against the use of force into the Charter of the Organization of
American States, to which both Panama and the United States are par-
ties.67 Drafted against the background of a series of military interven-
tions by the United States in Central America in the early twentieth
century,68 the Charter states in Article 18 that "[n]o state or group of
states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state." 69 In Arti-
cle 20, the Charter declares that "the territory of a state is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of
other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on
any grounds whatever." 70
Before the United States can claim a right of self-defense arising from
the National Assembly's resolution and the December 16 incidents, it
must demonstrate that these actions constituted an "armed attack" on
the United States within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.
63. Id. "The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing
treaties or in fulffillment thereof." Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 21,
Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter O.A.S. Charter].
This provision is generally read to be consistent with the restrictive interpretation of self-de-
fense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See A. THOMAs & A. THoMAs, THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF AMERICAN STATES 252-53 (1963). For this reason, this article explicitly analyzes the
right to self-defense under the U.N. Charter, although implicit in these discussions is the prop-
osition that the analysis would be the same under the O.A.S. Charter.
.64. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33.
65. Id. art. 2(4).
66. Id. art. 51.
67. O.A.S. Charter, supra note 63.
68. R. STEEL, PAX AMERiCANA 194-98 (1970).
69. O.A.S. Charter, supra note 63, art. 18.
70. Id. art. 20.
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In this case, the December 15 resolution did not demonstrate an intent
to undertake military action against the United States. It was a statement
that the United States had committed aggression against Panama by eco-
nomic means.71 (This position finds some support in the Charter of the
Organization of American States, which provides that "[n]o State may
use... coercive measures of an economic... character in order to force
the sovereign will of another State.") 72 The resolution was more a state-
ment that the United States had initiated war with Panama than it was a
statement of Panamanian intent to initiate war against the United
States.7
3
The December 15 resolution was not Panama's first reference to a
"state of war" with the United States. In August 1989, the United States
held military maneuvers in Panama. Described in the press as "conspic-
uous," they included the sending of armored personnel carriers through
streets near Panama City.74 Panama charged that U.S. soldiers had en-
gaged in "unauthorized searching of civilians" and had committed "acts
of intimidation against the population."' 75 Panama asserted before the
United Nations Security Council that the maneuvers violated the Canal
treaties and created "a state of imminent war."' 76 Yet no violent acts by
Panama against the United States or its nationals immediately followed
this reference to a "state of war."
A state the size of Panama could not easily commence a war against a
state the size of the United States, particularly with 12,000 U.S. troops
stationed in its territory, and there are no indications that Panama in-
tended to start such a war or to systematically assault U.S. nationals in
Panama. Instead, the pronouncement of a state of war with the United
States was evidently a predicate for granting General Noriega the posi-
tion of "chief of government."
' 77
Thus, the National Assembly's resolution was not an "armed attack"
that would invoke a right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
71. Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader" supra note 36.
72. O.A.S. Charter, supra note 63, art. 19.
73. See US Policy of Grinding Down Noriega Stalls, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 20, 1989,
at 1, col. 3.
74. U.S. Is Faulted on Military Maneuvers in Panama, supra note 25.
75. Panama Urges U.N. to Send Observers, supra note 31.
76. Id.; see also Panama, United States Again Before Council, supra note 27.
77. Noriega Appointed "Maximum Leader" supra note 36; Noriega's "State of War"Seen
as Quest for Backing, supra note 41. White House Press Secretary Fitzwater said that both the
resolution about a "state of war" and the elevation of General Noriega to maximum leader
were aimed at forcing the rule of General Noriega on the Panamanian people. Panama Assem-
bly Names Noriega Government Chief, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at A4, col. I.
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Nations Charter.78 Panama's National Assembly did not declare war on
the United States. But even if it had, the declaration would not consti-
tute aggression. A nation commits aggression only when it mounts an
"armed attack," and a verbal declaration of war is not an "armed at-
tack."' 79 Self-defense requires an attack - under one view an attack that
has commenced, and under another, an attack that is imminent.80 The
fact that an attack may be planned some time in the future is not
sufficient.
The United States claimed that it acted to prevent imminent attacks on
U.S. personnel, both military and civilian. But such attacks do not con-
stitute an attack on the United States. The General Assembly Definition
of Aggression includes, as aggression, an attack on the armed forces of
another state.81 It does not, however, include attacks on civilians. A
state which attacks the civilian nationals of another state is liable for
reparations to that state, 2 but its actions do not constitute an armed
attack on it.83
Under prevailing principles governing the use of force, the United
States could not validly claim, self-defense as a justification for its inva-
sion of Panama. Its assertion of self-defense, however, does represent a
logical progression in a series of expansive interpretations the Depart-
ment of State gave to the right of self-defense during the 1980s. In a
number of instances in which it used force against other states in the past
decade, the United States justified its actions with arguments that ex-
ceeded accepted international law norms in four respects. In particular,
the United States (1) gave a broad reading to the concept of anticipatory
self-defense; (2) did not demonstrate facts necessary to justify its uses of
force; (3) asserted that attacks on its citizens could constitute an attack
78. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
five self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
79. Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doe. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression];
A. RIFAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOP-
MENT AND DEFINITON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 267-77 (1979).
80. See infira notes 84-86.
81. Definition of Aggression, supra note 79, art. 3(d).
82. Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of
Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. (sliecial supp.) 133 (1929) (art. 7).
83. Attacks on individual military personnel also do not to constitute aggression against
the state under the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, which requires an attack "on
the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State." Definition of Aggression,
supra note 79, art. 3(d). This formulation appears to contemplate attacks on organized forces
rather than assaults on individual military personnel. This conclusion is reinforced by the
statement in article 2 that an act that might otherwise qualify as aggression should not be so
considered if "the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity." Id. art 2.
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on itself as a state; and (4) ignored the requirement of proportionality
between the levels of force used by the attacking state and the United
States.
A. Anticipatory Self-Defense
The assertion of self-defense for the Panama intervention was not a
claim that an "armed attack" had occurred but a claim that such an
attack was anticipated. It was thus a claim of a right to use force in
expectation of the use of force by Panama. Given the United Nations
Charter Article 51 requirement that an armed attack occur before force
may be used, most publicists deny that a state may attack in anticipation
of an expected attack,8 4 and few states have invoked the concept.85 Those
publicists who support the doctrine have said that the force anticipated
must be imminent.8 6 In several incidents in the 1980s when it used force
against another state, the United States relied on a claim of anticipatory
self-defense under circumstances in which the imminence of the target
state's use of force was not self-evident.
In its 1983 invasion of Grenada, for example, the Department of State
relied on an asserted likelihood that Grenada would attack neighboring
states. President Reagan said Grenada was "being readied as a major
military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. 87 President
Reagan relied on a request to the United States for intervention from the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S.), a request that the
O.E.C.S. made on the theory that Grenada might attack other Caribbean
states.88 Neither President Reagan nor the O.E.C.S., however, claimed
84. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948); L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE 141-45 (1979); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 275-78 (1963) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW]; Brownie, The Prin-
ciple of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 24 (W. Butler ed. 1989) [hereinafter Brownlie, Principle].
85. Brownlie, Principle, supra note 84, at 24; Schachter, In Defense of International Rules
on Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 123 (1986) [hereinafter Schachter, In Defense] (stat-
ing that most U.N. members favor restrictive interpretation of article 51, limiting it to an
"armed attack" that has occurred). One of the most often cited examples of anticipatory self-
defense is Israel's attack on Egypt in June 1967, to which the international reaction was mixed.
The reason for the lack of wide condemnation was due in part to the fact that Israel initially
claimed, falsely, that Egypt had attacked first, and this claim was believed by many states.
When it later acknowledged having attacked first and asserted anticipatory self-defense, many
states did not understand that in fact Israel had not expected an attack by Egypt when it
invaded. See J. QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 161-67
(1990).
86. D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-93 (1958).
87. Reagan, America's Commitment to Peace, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1, 4 (Dec. 1983).
88. Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68
(O.E.C.S. Statement).
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that any such attacks "were imminent.8 9 The United States also claimed
that Grenada planned to take United States citizens in Grenada as hos-
tages, but it produced no information about the imminence of any ex-
pected hostage-taking, and there was little reason to believe that such
acts would occur.90
In 1986, the United States bombed sites in Libya, inflicting substantial
loss of life and property damage,91 and asserted in justification that Libya
was likely to undertake terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens in the fu-
ture.92 Claiming to possess information about specific.attacks planned on
United States installations,93 the Reagan Administration stated, "It is
our hope this action will pre-empt and discourage Libyan attacks against
innocent civilians in the future."'94
In Panama, the United States claim of self-defense rested on what the
United States claimed was a threat of force by Panama. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that force should be permissible in self-defense in the
face of a credible, serious threat of force, and they cite as an example the
situation in Europe on the eve of World War II.9 The rationale is that
the other European powers could have prevented the war by preemptive
89. Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada Stranger than Fiction, 18 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 271, 305 (1986-87).
90. Quigley, supra note 89, at 281; Brownlie, Principle, supra note 84, at 23.
91. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 17; Intoccia,
American Bombing of Libya An International Legal Analysis, 19 CAsE W. REs. I. INT'L L.
177, 179 (1987).
92. Plots on Global Scale Charged, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
93. Id; Announcement by Speakes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at A13, col. 5; Intoccia,
supra note 91, at 185, 190-91 (Administration asserted Libyan responsibility for Mar. 25, 1986
bombing of discotheque in West Germany frequented by U.S. servicemen); iad at 190 (Admin-
istration said it had "solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi has planned against the
United States' installations and diplomats and even American tourists").
94. Announcement by Speakes, supra note 93. For an analysis that suggests that the attack
was a reprisal rather than an act of self-defense, see Paust, Responding Lawfully to Interna-
tional Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHrrIIER L. REv. 711, 729-32 (1986).
Although it was not directed against another state, the United States use of force in 1985 to
divert an Egyptian airliner to detain suspected terrorists in the Achille Lauro hijacking raises
similar issues. Claiming that "Americans are... targets of continued terrorism," President
Reagan justified the action as a deterrent to future terrorist acts by the suspects or other ter-
rorists. Transcript of White House News Conference on the Hiacking, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1985, at A6, col. 1. The Legal Adviser's Office did not raise a claim of self-defense in that
instance, but argued instead that the action was a lawful countermeasure to Egypt's breach of
its obligation to either try or extradite the suspects. Concerning that theory, see Plane Diver-
sion Raises Legal Issues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at All, col. 4.
Moreover, in the United Nations Security Council discussion of a similar aircraft diversion
by Israel in 1986, the United States vetoed a resolution condemning the diversion as an unlaw-
ful use of force. The United States representative stated that "the ability to take such action in
carefully defined and limited circumstances is an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense
recognized in the United Nations Charter." 41 U.N. SCOR (2655th mtg.) at 113, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2655 (1986).
95. Schachter, In Defense, supra note 85, at 134.
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action against Germany on the eve of its initiation of the war.96
Whatever the validity of such an approach, the purported Panamanian
threat was far from being so clear and significant that waiting would have
jeopardized the United States.
B. Proof of Facts to Show That an Attack Might Occur
One component of demonstrating that an attack is imminent is prov-
ing before "an impartial international tribunal" that it will occur at all. 97
Before the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. U.S., the
United States argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction under the
United Nations Charter over issues involving an ongoing use of force,
and that therefore the United States did not have to present evidence to
justify to the Court its assertion of the need for use of force in self-de-
fense.98 It contended that a decision by the Court against the United
States would have "the effect of impairing the inherent right of a State to
engage in individual or collective self-defense," as guaranteed by Article
51 of the United Nations Charter.99 The Legal Adviser to the Depart-
ment of State said that "[flor the United States to recognize that the ICJ
has authority to define and adjudicate with respect to our right of self-
defense.., is effectively to surrender to that body the power to pass upon
our efforts to guarantee the safety and security of this nation." 1 °
The International Court of Justice disagreed with the United States
argument. 101 In his dissenting opinion in Nicaragua v. U.S., Judge
Schwebel agreed with the majority that a self-defense claim raises a justi-
ciable issue. In support he quoted Hersch Lauterpacht, who wrote that a
claim that self-defense is "above the law and not amenable to evaluation
by law" is
self-contradictory, inasmuch as it purports to be based on legal rights, and
as, at the same time, it dissociates itself from regulation and evaluation by
the law. Like any other dispute involving important issues, so also the
96. Id
97. D. BOWETr, supra note 86, at 105.
98. Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America (The Questions of the
Jurisdiction of the Court to Entertain the Dispute and of the Admissibility of Nicaragua's
Application) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Military and Paramilitary Activities In
and Against Nicaragua) 451 (Aug. 17, 1984) [hereinafter U.S. Counter-Memorial]; id. at
516.
99. Id at 345.
100. US. Decision to Withdraw from the International Court of Justice: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and Iqternational Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 99th Coig., 1st Sess. 28 (1985) (statement of A. Sofaer, Legal Ad-
viser, Dep't of State).
101. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,
Merits, Judgment (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 27 [hereinafter Nicaragua: Merits].
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question of the right of recourse to war in self-defense is in itself capable of
judicial decision.' 02
Another analyst has said, respecting the rules on use of force, that it is
"incompatible with the concept of law that an entity subject to the law
should have the final authority to determine whether a legal rule applies
to it.'"103 One author has further suggested that the apprehensions of a
state purportedly acting in self-defense "must be confirmed by objective
factors reflective of an attack reasonably certain to occur."' 1 4 The Inter-
national Court took that approach with its finding ofjusticiability in Nic-
aragua v. U.S. and its assessment of the United States basis for
apprehension. 105
No firm standard of proof has been devised for the determination of
issues of fact in international litigation. The International Court of Jus-
tice imposes proof burdens with respect to facts at issue, typically placing
the burden on the state asserting a position.10 6 Only rarely, however,
bave international tribunals referred to or addressed the question of stan-
dard of proof, probably because of the influence of Continental legal sys-
tems, which do not draw the distinctions developed in the common law
between proof by a preponderance of the evidence, proof by clear and
convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but refer only
to the need to establish the truth, without indicating a degree of
certainty. 0 7
Whichever standard of proof might be required, the United States did
not meet it with respect to its action in Panama. It provided little proof
of future attacks. The Department of State provided no information be-
yond the press statements made on the day of the invasion and brief
statements before the Organization of American States and United Na-
tions. °10  Nor, in the indicated instances of use of force by the United
102. Id at 286.
103. Schachter, In Defense, supra note 85, at 120.
104. Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. . INT'L L. 129, 151 (1987).
105. Nicaragua: Merits, supra note 101.
106. Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 39 (Lauterpacht, J., sep. op.); S.
ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 580 (1985).
107. See generally .-F. Lalive, "Quetques remarques sur la preuve devant la Cour
permanente et la Cour internationale dejustice, 7 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTER-
NATIONALES RECHT/ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 77 (1950). For a rare
example of reference to standard of proof, see Costello Case, quoted in D. SANDIFER, EVI-
DENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 170 (1975) (requiring "concrete and convincing
evidence" from claimant state before U.S.-Mexico arbitral tribunal).
108. PANAMA: A JUST CAUSE, supra note 39.
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States in Grenada and Libya during the 1980s, did it demonstrate the
likelihood of the attacks that it said justified its actions. 109
C. Attack on Citizens as Attack on the State
The claim of self-defense to justify the Panama action reflects another
position taken by the United States during the 1980s, namely, that an
attack on its citizens may constitute an "armed attack" giving rise to a
right of self-defense. The United States justified the invasion of Grenada,
in part, on a claim that United States citizens in Grenada might be vic-
timized by the government of Grenada.110 It defended its bombing of
Libya, as indicated, as a pre-emption of possible future attacks by Libya
on United States citizens."' In each of these incidents, the United States
took the position that an attack on United States citizens abroad consti-
tutes an attack on the United States itself, entitling it to use force in self-
defense.
When the United Nations General Assembly wrote a definition of ag-
gression in 1974, it included attacks on a state's armed forces, but not on
its citizens.112 Nevertheless, according to one view, a state has a right to
intervene militarily in another state to protect its nationals if they are in
danger; this right is said to flow from the right of self-defense.113 The
danger to the nationals, however, must be "actual or imminent,"' 14 and
sucfi action is "an exceptional measure, available as a last resort to pre-
vent irreparable injury." 115
This asserted justification for intervention has seldom been invoked
since the United Nations Charter entered into force. It has been criti-
cized on the ground that it is open only to more powerful states, and that
it is susceptible to abuse by a state that actually desires to intervene for
another reason. 116 It has been regarded with particular suspicion in situa-
tions such as the instant one, where the intervening state removed the
existing government.117 Although an intervening state might argue that
the only way to protect endangered nationals is to change the govern-
109. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
110. Quigley, supra note 89, at 275.
111. Plots on Global Scale Charged, supra note 92.
112. Definition of Aggression, supra note 79.
113. D. BowEar, supra note 86, at 87; A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 209-10
(1961); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,
81 RECUEIL DES COuRS 451, 503 (1952).
114. D. BOWETr, supra note 86, at 88, 99; Waldock, supra note 113, at 503 (justification if
an "instant and overwhelming need of action to save the life of nationals").
115. D. BowETr, supra note 86, at 98.
116. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, at 338-39.
117. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1632
(1984) [hereinafter Schachter, Right of States].
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ment, that reasoning has not gained acceptance. For example, when the
United States intervened in 1965 in the Dominican Republic, its asser-
tion of a need to change the government cast doubt on the good faith of
the original claim of a need to protect its nationals. 118 And when the
United States made the same argument to justify its Grenada invasion,
there too it was met with suspicion, in part because the United States
removed the existing government from power.119
Although states have typically condemned unilateral interventions jus-
tified by the intervening state as protection of endangered nationals, the
reactions have not gone beyond condemnatory resolutions. Nevertheless,
the lenient reactions do not indicate that the condemnation is not genu-
ine. It is a reflection, rather, of the state of international organization
and of the inability of the international community to cope with military
conflict. The condemnation has typically come from both developing
and developed states, although the former have generally been harsher in
their criticism and less willing to consider the circumstances that led the
intervening state to act.12 0 This difference reflects the fact that a rule
permitting intervention to protect endangered nationals threatens the de-
veloping states more than it does the developed states. The developing
states are more concerned about pretextual use of the doctrine, since in-
tervening states invoking it have often acted for other reasons.12
1
While the International Court of Justice has never ruled on the valid-
ity of an intervention to protect nationals, its ruling in the Corfu Channel
case'22 suggests that intervention is not justified even if the intervening
state does not intend to change the government of the other state, and
even if it is acting in response to action by that state that is both unlawful
and hazardous to human life. While acknowledging that Albania had
violated international law by failing to notify shippers of the existence of
mines in its waters that had killed personnel on British ships and that
constituted a continuing threat to shipping, the Court ruled that Britain
118. M. BENNOUNA, LE CONSENTEMENT A L'INGPRENCE MILITAIRE DANS LES CONFLITS
mNrERNEs 180 (1974); cf Presidential Text, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1965, at A14, col. 1 (Presi-
dent Johnson states that he is dispatching troops to Dominican Republic "to protect American
lives"); see also Text of Johnson's Address on US. Moves in the Conflict in the Dominican
Republic, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965, at AlO, col. 1 (President Johnson says U.S. intervened "to
protect American lives"; also that U.S. was responding to danger of establishment of Commu-
nist government in Dominican Republic).
119. Quigley, supra note 89, at 278-80; Brownlie, Principle, supra note 84, at 23.
120. See, eg., infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
121. Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 271, 277 (1985).
122. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 [hereinafter Corfu Channel].
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had no right to violate Albanian territorial sovereignty to remove the
mines.123
The Court regarded "the alleged right of intervention as the manifesta-
tion of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most seri-
ous abuses and such as cannot... find a place in international law." 124 It
criticized such a right of intervention as one that, "from the nature of
things," could be used only by "the most powerful States." 125
Military interventions to assist endangered nationals have been contro-
versial even when the danger was obvious and the intervening state did
not try to overthrow the government of the target state. When Israel
intervened militarily in Uganda in 1976, sending troops to free nationals
held hostage, the Organization of African Unity condemned the ac-
tion,126 and in United Nations Security Council discussions most Third
World and socialist states did likewise, although most Western states
found it justifiable. 127
Nevertheless, even if it were acceptable to use force to rescue endan-
gered nationals, such a rule would not justify the United States action in
Panama, since, as indicated, there was no showing of an imminent dan-
ger to United States nationals. Furthermore, such a justification would
fail for the additional reason that overthrowing Panama's government
was a disproportionate response to the purported danger. This aspect of
the operation requires exploration of the doctrine of proportionality in
the law of self-defense.
D. Requirement of Proportionality in Use of Force
While no treaty norm addresses the issue of proportionality, a state
acting in self-defense may use only such force as is necessary to repel an
attack. 128 This rule flows from the concept that a state may use force
defensively only to the extent necessary. 129 Thus, a requirement of pro-
portionality is implicit in the United Nations Charter Article 51 provi-
123. Id
124. Id at 35.
125. Id
126. 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) at 48, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (1976) (statement of Mr.
Salim, Tanzania).
127. Brownlie, Princlple, supra note 84, at 23; 13 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Aug.-Sept.
1976, at 15, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1941 (1976); McDowell, United Nations: Security Council De-
bate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the En-
tebbe Airport, 15 I.L.M. 1224 (1976).
128. I. BROWNLiE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, at 261-64; Schachter, Right of
States, supra note 117, at 1637-38; D. BowETr, supra note 86, at 105 (as applied to force
against another state to assist endangered nationals).
129. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84, at 261.
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sion on self-defense. In this case, both the overthrow of Noriega's regime
and the actual means employed to bring about this result exceeded the
bounds of proportionality.
Issues of proportionality have typically arisen where the putative ag-
gressor has used a given amount of forcetand the putative defender has
responded with counter-force. The counter-force then can be measured
against the original force. But the application of the proportionality rule
to force used in anticipatory self-defense is problematic. Where no force
has been used by the putative aggressor, there is no standard by which to
establish how much force can lawfully be used by the putative defender.
This problem has led one authority to conclude that to use force "when
there is only circumstantial evidence of impending attack would be to act
in a manner which disregarded the requirement of proportionality."' 30
Stated differently, any anticipatory use of force is out of proportion.
But assuming arguendo that Panama was about to attack, that antici-
patory use of force is permissible, and that force against nationals is an
"armed attack" against their state, the level of force used by the United
States would still render its self-defense claim problematic. The United
States claimed a need to remove the existing government of Panama in
order to ensure that attacks would not occur against United States na-
tionals. The United Nations Security Council, however, has at other
times condemned military action as unlawful when it went that far. In
analyzing responsive military action, the Security Council has frequently
declared that the scale of the response rendered the action unlawful.13 ' In
Panama, it is doubtful that a massive troop invasion 32 to overthrow the
existing government was a proportional response to any attack that Pan-
ama might have been planning. 13
3
Furthermore, the amount of destruction inflicted by the invasion ex-
ceeded the bounds of proportionality. In assaulting the P.D.F. head-
quarters in Panama City, United States forces, using aerial
bombardment, levelled several city blocks in the vicinity of the headquar-
ters. 34 It is estimated that between two hundred and several thousand
130. Id. at 259.
131. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-13, 33-
36 (1972). Legal Adviser Sofaer said that "only that result [the removal of Gen. Noriega from
power] could end the attacks on Americans." Remarks of Abraham Sofaer, supra note 59.
132. Officials Say Panama Taking More Time and Troops Than Expected, Wash. Post,
Dec. 23, 1989, at A6, col. 6.
133. U.S. Cites Self-Defens; Legal Scholars Skeptical, supra note 1 (quoting Prof.
Schachter that invasion violated requirement of proportionality).
134. With the Dictator Disabled, Panama Looks to Rebuild, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec.
27, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
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persons were killed 35 and an additional several thousand persons were
wounded in the attack.
136
If a threat of a Panamanian attack actually existed, and if international
law permits the use of force in anticipation of an attack on nationals, the
United States might justifibly have made a show of force against Panama
- for example, by stationing naval vessels off its coasts. But even given
such a threat, the United States would not have been justified in causing
such extensive damage to persons and property in Panama.
In Panama the United States exceeded proportionality, not only in the
invasion itself, but also by interning large numbers of Panamanians. The
United States forces detained some 4,800 Panamanians for varying peri-
ods, including some who had engaged in military action against U.S.
forces and others who had not, but who supported General Noriega. 137
The United States Army Staff Judge Advocate for the Southern Com-
mand classified all the internees as "belligerents" and justified the intern-
ments on the grounds of self-defense of the United States forces and
protection of the Panama Canal.' 38 But the sheer number of detentions
constituted a use of force that was difficult to justify in terms of necessity.
135. No More Panamas, Bush Aides Predict, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at A9, col. 1 (esti-
mate of 400 by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, estimate of a minimum of
1,000 by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark); The Invasion's Civilian Toll: Still No Offi-
cial Count, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at A9, col. 3; Panamd sumida en el caos y Noriega
contindaprdfugo, La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (estimate by representa-
tive of overthrown Panamanian government of between 6,000 and 7,000 killed); Acusan a
LE. UU. de esconder una matanza, La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Dec. 26, 1989, at 2, col. 3 (Red
Cross representative says "at least two thousand killed; the morgues of the hospitals are over-
flowing and there is no more room"); Invasion Took Its Toll in Deaths, Human Suffering,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 29, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (estimate of 1,000 civilians killed); Report
from Panama, GUILD NoTEs (Natl Law. Guild), Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 1, 5 (estimate of 2,000
civilians killed); Wicker, Panama and the Press, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at A25, col. 1
(Army's Southern Command announces 202 civilians and approximately 50 Panamanian
soldiers killed).
136. In Invasion's Wake, Disorder Reigns in Panamanian Capital, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Dec. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (estimate of over 1,000 wounded); INTERNATIONAL CoMMITTEE OF
THE RED CRoss, BULL. No. 169, US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PANAMA 2 (1990) (hospi-
tals in Panama City were "inundated with civilian and military casualties. Over 800 people
were treated during the first few days ... medicines and medical material were in short sup-
ply." The I.C.R.C. brought in two planeloads of medical supplies to make up the shortfall).
Legal Adviser Sofaer justified the tremendous force used by the United States, saying,
"[w]ithout total victory the P.D.F. and/or Noriega would have utilized their massive store of
weapons to make democratic government impossible. A protracted operation would have been
a tactical disaster and would have exposed U.S. civilians to continuing danger." Remarks of
Abraham Sofaer, supra note 59.
137. Captured Panamanians Pose Test of Changing Rules on POWs, Wash. Post, Dec. 31,
1989, at A18, col. 1; U.S. Declares It's Releasing Panama Invasion Captives, N.Y. Times, Jan.
19, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
138. Captured Panamanians Pose Test of Changing Rules on POWs, supra note 137. Nev-
ertheless, the Staff Judge Advocate stated: "All of the traditional rules were written for the
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The United States claim of self-defense in the Panama invasion de-
pends on facts that did not demonstrate an "armed attack." Its reliance
on the disputed doctrines of anticipatory self-defense and protection of
endangered nationals are undercut by the lack of solid evidence indicat-
ing a plan by Panama to attack United States nationals in Panama.
Moreover, even if the United States had grounds for some military action
against Panama, the action it took exceeded the bounds of
proportionality.
The article next turns to the other legal justification asserted by the
United States for its action in Panama: the protection of the Panama
Canal.
IV. The Claim of Protection of the Panama Canal
President Bush, explaining the invasion, referred to the United States
obligation to turn the Canal over to Panama in the year 2000 and said
that "[t]he actions we have taken... will permit us to honor these com-
mitments." 139 Secretary Baker said that one objective was "to defend the
integrity of United States' rights under the canal treaties."'140 He said
that "the United States has both the right and, for that matter, the duty
to protect and defend the Canal under Article 4 of the Panama Canal
Treaty." 141 Article 4 of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 states:
The United States of America and the Republic of Panama commit them-
selves to protect and defend the Panama Canal. Each Party shall act, in
accordance with its constitutional processes, to meet the danger resulting
from an armed attack or other actions which threaten the security of the
Panama Canal or of ships transiting it. 142
A Department of Justice spokesperson also cited the other 1977 Canal
treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation
of the Panama Canal, 143 as a legal basis for the U.S. intervention. 14 The
Neutrality Treaty was concluded to ensure that the Canal remains open
to ships of all states.145 Article 4 of the Neutrality Treaty provides that
classic war.... When you take those rules and translate them to Panama, they don't work
very well." Id
139. A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, supra note 44.
140. Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, supra note 53.
141. Id.
142. 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 11, art. 4(1). Ambassador Pickering also cited
article 4 of the Panama Canal Treaty as a legal basis for the United States action. See PAN-
AMA: A JusT CAUSE, supra note 39, at 2.
143. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16.
144. Administration Says International Agreements Support Its Action, N.Y. Times, Dec.
21, 1989, at A22, col. 3 (statement of David Runkel).
145. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 2.
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"[t]he United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to
maintain the regime of neutrality established in this Treaty."' 146
The United States based its claim of a need to use force to ensure Ca-
nal operations on the alleged harassment of Canal personnel. 147 It said
that the harassment violated Panama's obligation under the Canal trea-
ties to ensure the unimpeded operation of the Canal for the ships of all
states.'48 In May 1989 the United States accused Panamanian authorities
of harassing a number of U.S. military personnel, evacuated some mili-
tardependents from Panama, 149 and claimed that the harassment vio-
lated the Canal treaties.' 50 The United States also cited as a further
treaty violation the arrest by Panamanian military authorities of fifteen
employees of a United States firm that provided security for the United
States Embassy.15'
The United States charged the Panamanian government with a "cam-
paign of harassment" against U.S. military personnel, 152 and in August
1989 the United States went before the United Nations Security Council
and cited 900 incidents of harassment since February 1986 by which
Panama had violated the Canal treaties. 53 Also, in August, U.S. mili-
tary authorities detained nine P.D.F. soldiers and twenty Panamanian
civilians who they said were responsible for interfering with the large-
scale military maneuvers the United States conducted in Panama. 154 An
Administration official said of the harassment: "We intend to enforce our
rights under the Panama Canal treaties."' 155 Intended by the United
States "to reassert United States rights under the Panama Canal treaties
and to discourage harassment of American servicemen,"'156 the maneu-
vers met with criticism from the Organization of American States, which
146. Id art. 4.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
148. Administration Says International Agreements Support Its Action, supra note 144 (Sec-
retary of State Baker says harassment is evidence that U.S. rights under Canal treaties were
threatened by Noriega).
149. First Families Arrive in U.S., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1989, at A8, col. 3.
150. Panama Guards at US. Embassy Seized, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1989, at A3, col. 4;
Administration Says International Agreements Support Its Action, supra note 144.
151. Panama Guards at US. Embassy Seized, supra note 150.
152. Military Arrests Exacerbate U.S.-Panamanian Relations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989,
at A8, col. 3.
153. Panama, United States again before Council, supra note 27 (statement of Herbert S.
Okun); see also Panama Guards at U.S. Embassy Seized, supra note 150 (Department of De-
fense charged that Panama "violated the canal treaties.., more than 1,200 times in the last 15
months by harassing United States military personnel and dependents").
154. Military Arrests Exacerbate US.-Panamanian Relations, supra note 152.
155. Id
156. US. Is Faulted on Military Maneuvers in Panama, supra note 25.
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labelled them "inopportune" and said that they interfered with its efforts
to convince General Noriega to resign. 157
The invasion of Panama thus was the culmination of tensions sur-
rounding the United States approaching obligation to turn the Canal
over to Panama. Contrary to the Bush Administration's argument, how-
ever, Panama's alleged violations of its obligations under the Canal trea-
ties did not give the United States the right to use force against Panama.
V. Assessment of the Claim of Protection of the Panama Canal
The Administration's claim of a right to use force against Panama on
the basis of the Panama Canal treaties encounters both factual and legal
problems. Panama had not breached its duty to permit the free transit of
ships through the Canal; and even if it had, the Canal treaties do not give
the United States a right to intervene militarily against Panama.
First, despite Secretary Baker's allegations of a "continuing pattern of
harassment that we've seen going on down there against Americans in
the exercise of our treaty rights,"158 the Canal had continued to operate.
The harassment incidents did not amount to a material breach of Pan-
ama's treaty obligation to permit the unimpeded transit of ships.15 9 Pan-
ama had not indicated an intent to interfere with the Canal's operation,
and there was little reason to believe that the Canal would not continue
to function. 160 The conduct of the invasion shows that the United States,
despite its rhetoric, was fully aware of this situation; even after the inva-
sion began, United States forces showed no concern that the P.D.F.
might try to sabotage the Canal and took no precautions to protect it. 161
In fact, the Department of State had acknowledged on November 2,
1989 that Panama had not interfered with Canal operations. In Congres-
sional testimony, Michael G. Kozak, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, admitted that "[d]espite [the Noriega] re-
gime['s] efforts to change U.S. nonrecognition policy by harassing U.S.
157. Id
158. Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, supra note 53.
159. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the United
States, but the United States has cited article 60 as reflective of customary law. See A.
ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1973 307, 482-83
(1974).
160. George Bush, contra reloj, El Pais (Madrid), Dec. 25, 1989, at 2, col. 1 (stating that
"there is no evidence that might prove that Noriega or his forces had any intention of attack-
ing the installations of the waterway") (translation); Challenge for Panamanians: A Canal in
Transition, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at A3, col. I (despite harassment in 1988-89, "ship
traffic on the canal was hardly disrupted").
161. US Forces Strike Panama in Bid to Oust Strongman, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 21,
1989, at 1, col. 4.
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and Panamanian employees of the U.S. forces and the Panama Canal
Commission, Noriega has seemingly sought to avoid a direct threat to
the canal or a direct challenge to the proper exercise of U.S. rights. 1' 62
Although Kozak said that U.S. rights under the 1977 Canal treaties had
not been violated, he did see a possible future threat to Canal operations;
in his words, "it becomes clearer each day that Noriega's continuation in
power is a threat not only to the interests and freedom of his own people,
but also to the canal."' 163 Thus, if the United States did see a threat to the
Canal, it was a future, not an immediate, threat.
Furthermore, even if Panama had violated its obligation to permit the
free operation of the Canal, such a violation would not clearly give the
United States a right to take military action against Panama under any
treaty. Although the Neutrality Treaty commits the United States and
Panama to maintain "the regime of neutrality,"' 164 it is silent on any U.S.
military right to defend the Canal.
Concerned with defining the rights of the United States under the Neu-
trality Treaty, President Carter concluded a "statement of understand-
ing" with Panama's General Omar Torrijos as an interpretation of the
Neutrality Treaty.165 Providing that the United States and Panama shall
"defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality and con-
sequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat di-
rected against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through
the Canal," the statement gives the United States an unequivocal right to
use force.166 The statement, however, also clearly prevents the United
States from using force against the government of Panama. It continues:
This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as the right of intervention of
the United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States ac-
tion will be directed at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and
accessible, and it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Panama. 167
This language tracks that of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter, 68 indicating that the United States was not obtaining a right to use
force against Panama itself, except as such force might be authorized
162. BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 1226, PAN-
AMA CANAL: THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION 3 (1989) (statement of M. Kozak).
163. Id
164. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 16, art. 4.
165. US.-Panama Statement of Understanding, 77 DEP'T ST. BULL. 631 (Nov. 1977).
166. Id
167. Id
168. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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under the United Nations Charter.169 The Charter, however, gives the
United States the right to use force against Panama only in self-de-
fense. 170 Therefore, the Neutrality Treaty does not grant the United
States a separate right to intervene against the government of Panama
under the guise of defending the Canal.171
Nor does the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty give the United States a right
to intervene against the government of Panama, no matter how serious
the threats to the Canal. By the Canal Treaty, Panama, "as territorial
sovereign, grant[ed] to the United States of America... the right[ ] ...
to protect and defend the Canal"'172 until December 31, 1999.173 It gave
the United States "primary responsibility to protect and defend the Ca-
nal" until that date, including a right to maintain troops in Panama for
that purpose. 174
The Canal Treaty gives the United States no extraterritorial rights in
Panama; it recognizes the Canal and the land surrounding it as the terri-
tory of Panama.175 The treaty commits the United States to dismantle its
Canal Zone Government 76 and to allow Panama to "reassume plenary
jurisdiction over the former Canal Zone."'177 Most important, the parties
agreed to resolve any dispute arising under the treaty by diplomatic
means and, failing that, "to submit the matter to conciliation, mediation,
arbitration, or such other procedure for the peaceful settlement of the
dispute as they may mutually deem appropriate.' 78
The Canal Treaty thus does not give the United States a right to use
military force except for the purpose of defending the Canal. Its effect
was in that respect similar to that of the Neutrality Treaty as interpreted
in the "statement of understanding."'' 79 Panama, as the territorial sover-
eign, did not agree to a use of force against itself. While the Canal Treaty
169. Maier, United States Defense Rights in the Panama Canal Treaties: The Need for
Clarification of a Studied Ambiguity, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 287, 303 (1984).
170. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
171., R. PERRUCHOUD, LE RtGIME DE NEUTRALITI DU CANAL DE PANAMA 237-38
(1983).
172. 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
173. Id art. 2(2).
174. Id art. 4(2). The specifics of U.S. military presence were handled in a separate treaty
entitled Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7,
1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. 307, T.I.A.S. No. 10032, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1068
(1977).
175. 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 11, art. 1.
176. Id art. 3(10).
177. Id art. 11.
178. Id art. 14.
179. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. Legal Adviser Sofaer has said, to the
contrary, that the Panama Canal Treaty gave the United States the right to use military force
to protect the Canal from "internal threats." Remarks of Abraham Sofaer, supra note 59.
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has no explicit provisions on the point, the foregoing discussion of the
Canal Treaty's other terms makes it clear that, in the Treaty, Panama
granted the United States the right to use force only against entities other
than Panama. The Treaty does not permit the United States to use force
against Panama.
Both the Canal and Neutrality treaties, moreover, must be read to-
gether with the Charter of the Organization of American States. 180Arti-
cle 20 of that document, quoted above,"" bars military intervention in
the territory of another state. In the context of U.S.-Panama relations
and the two Canal treaties, this means, according to one commentator,
that "the United States is absolutely prohibited from entering Panama to
defend the Canal without Panamanian consent." 18 2 Thus, the two Canal
treaties themselves provide no basis for the United States to insert troops
into Panama without the consent of Panama; absent such consent, the
clear language of Article 20 of the O.A.S. Charter precludes a presump-
tion that the treaties give the United States any such right.183
The Canal and Neutrality treaties must also be read consistently with
the United Nations Charter, which prohibits force against the "territorial
integrity or political independence" of another state.18 4 The United
States argued that its use of force, aimed at protecting the Canal, was not
directed against Panama's territorial integrity, since the United States
had no intent to take territory from Panama or alter its borders. As
regards the prohibition on the use of force against Panama's "political
independence," the United States might claim that the effect of its action
was to make Panama more politically independent than formerly, rather
than interfering with Panama's political independence. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case, however, read Article
2(4) as prohibiting any forcible intrusion, even when the aim would not
change the boundaries or political order in the other state.185 The Court
ruled that Britain's claimed right to conduct a mine-sweeping operation
in Albanian waters in order to ensure the safety of international shipping
180. Maier, supra note 169, at 309; see Vienna Convention, supra note 159, art. 31(3)(c)
(indicating that a treaty is to be construed in light of "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties").
181. See text accompanying note 70.
182. Maier, supra note 169, at 309.
183. Id.
184. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
185. Schachter, Right of States, supra note 117, at 1626 (construing Corfu Channel opin-
ion as meaning that force is impermissible even when "derogation of territorial sovereignty was
limited in time and limited to the aim of securing legal rights").
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was inconsistent with Article 2(4). Thus, Article 2(4) prohibits forcible
intrusion into the territory of another state, regardless of the aim.18 6
In conclusion, neither the facts nor the law substantiate the Adminis-
tration's argument that Panama's alleged obstruction of Canal operations
gave the United States a right to use force to replace the Panamanian
government. While Panama and the United States had not cooperated
well during General Noriega's tenure, Panama did not violate its obliga-
tions to ensure the smooth functioning of the Canal. But even had it
done so, the United States had no legal basis under the two Canal treaties
or under international law to send troops to act against the government
of Panama.
VI. Promotion of Democracy in Panama
The Bush Administration identified four "objectives" of the action. In
addition to the two legal justifications asserted- self-defense and the
protection of the Canal- the Administration mentioned two other goals
motivating its decision to act in Panama: the promotion of democracy in
Panama, and the capture of General Noriega for trial on drug trafficking
charges.
President Bush said that one goal of the invasion was "to defend de-
mocracy in Panama;" 18 7 Secretary Baker stated that the United States
acted in consultation with "the legitimate, democratically elected govern-
ment of Panama, which welcomed our actions."188 The government to
which he referred was that of Guillermo Endara, the apparent victor of
the May 1989 presidential election.18 9 Neither President Bush nor Secre-
tary Baker, however, said that Endara requested military intervention or
that the United States intervened in response to such a request. Thus, as
a legal basis for attacking Panama, the United States did not rely on a
request from Guillermo Endara.
186. See generally Corfu Channel, supra note 122, at 4.
187. A Transcript ofBush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, supra note 44.
188. Excerpts From Statement by Baker on US. Policy, supra note 53. Ambassador Pick-
ering, in addressing the U.N. Security Council, said: "It is worth noting that the U.S. Govern-
ment consulted with the democratically elected leadership prior to last evening's actions, and
that they approved of our steps." PANAMA: A JuST CAUSE, supra note 39, at 1. Legal
Adviser Sofaer said that the United States government, as it contemplated invasion, "decided
it should seek President-elect Endara's cooperation in any military action eventually under-
taken." Remarks of Abraham Sofaer, supra note 59. However, Eduardo Vallarino, who rep-
resented the new Endara administration at the United Nations, told the United Nations that
Endara had not requested or authorized the U.S. military action, but that the U.S. decision
"was a unilateral decision by the U.S." He said, "we were not part of it." World Criticism of
U.S. Intervention Mounts, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1989, at A29, col. 2.
189. See sources cited supra note 24.
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The United States was well advised not to justify its invasion on a
request from Endara, because reliance on such a request would not have
provided a valid legal basis. International law no longer recognizes the
right of a government to request outside military intervention in a civil
confrontation. Rather, the prevailing principle obliges other states to re-
frain from intervening on the side of any party.190 The International
Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. U.S. said that this prohibition is found in
customary international law. 191
If the United States were to justify the invasion on the basis of a re-
quest from Endara, its rationale would have to be that the population of
Panama had, in the May election, expressed its will to have him as its
leader. Nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that the population
would desire outside military intervention in order to put him into office.
Further, if intervention were permissible to install a duly elected govern-
ment that had been prevented from taking office, the duration of the pe-
riod of validity of such intervention would still be unclear. If
intervention occurred well after the election, there might be less reason to
assume that the will of the populace still favored that group.
Some commentators have argued that international law should recog-
nize a right of one state to intervene in another for the purpose of stop-
ping human rights violations there.1 92 That theory pursues the admirable
goal of helping populations overthrow oppressive leadership. The draft-
ers of the United Nations Charter, however, rejected such an approach
by limiting the legitimate use of force to self-defense.1 93 The theory of
humanitarian intervention challenges the traditional doctrine that each
state should permit every other state to devise its own domestic political
processes, for such a theory would permit one state to determine that a
particular political leadership was inappropriate for another.
Proponents of the theory of humanitarian intervention have advanced
it primarily in connection with mass killings, or other serious abuse, by a
government of its people.194 If the United States were to apply the theory
to its invasion of Panama, it would be taking the theory a step further, to
justify the overthrow not of a government that is seriously abusing its
190. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNA'nONAL LAW, supra note 84, at 327.
191. Nicaragua: Merits, supra note 101, at 106-10.
192. See F. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MO-
RALrIY 5 (1988).
193. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51.
194. See, eg., Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The
World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L.
221, 233-40 (1989).
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citizens, but rather of.one that is denying them meaningful participation
in government.
Even if humanitarian intervention were allowed under the United Na-
tions Charter, the application of the humanitarian intervention theory
presupposes a unilateral determination by the intervening state that the
conditions in the other state warrant intervention. For intervention
under the theory to be valid, the intervening state would need to (a) accu-
rately estimate the level of democracy in the target state; (b) not allow
other considerations, in particular considerations of its own advantage,
to influence its decision to intervene; and (c) facilitate the accession to
power of a government that promotes democracy.
It is questionable whether states can ever satisfy these requirements.
First, the assessment of democracy in another state is a difficult one. No-
body has yet defined a universally accepted standard of democracy.
Even by the roughest standards, many states do not approach democ-
racy. In some states, the populations have long tolerated monarchies,
with no parliamentary institutions. In others, parliamentary process and
national elections have played only a minor role. Therefore, to allow
states to justify intervention to install democracy would be to allow them
plausibly to justify intervention in many other states; humanitarian
grounds might then become a pretext for other, non-humanitarian
motives.
Second, powerful states could abuse the theory of humanitarian inter-
vention.195 Intervention on any ground is an option available only to
more powerful states; to permit intervention on humanitarian grounds is
to institutionalize and sanction this inequality.
Moreover, in practice one does not find examples of an intervention
undertaken to improve the human rights of the population of the other
state. Inevitably, intervening states act out of considerations of their own
needs. They may believe themselves to be under attack, 196 or they may
195. Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649
(1984) [hereinafter Schachter, Legality]; Brownile, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 216, 226 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
196. This was the situation when Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979. Tanzania acted be-
cause of Uganda's attacks into Tanzania, not to stop human rights violhtions. As the
Tanzanian government said: "The war between Tanzania and Idi Amin's regime was caused
by the Ugandan Army's aggression against Tanzania and Idi Amin's claim to have annexed
part of Tanzanian territory. There was no other cause." Tanzania and the War Against
Amin's Uganda, in FOREIGN POLICY OF TANZANIA, 1961-1981: A READER 305 (K. Mathews
& S. Mushi eds. 1981). Yet one proponent of humanitarian intervention uses this action as an
example of force lawfully used to stop deprivations of human rights. See F. TES6N, supra note
192, at 174.
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be overthrowing a government for various political reasons. 197 The ex-
pectation that one state will act in an altruistic fashion to improve the lot
of the population of another is unrealistic. In the instant case, though
the United States may have claimed humanitarian goals in its invasion of
Panama, it may also have had other, self-interested motives. 19
8
Third, the method an intervening state uses to replace the government
it is overthrowing is also problematic. After invading Panama, the
United States arranged a swearing-in for Endara. As indicated above, 199
it is difficult for an intervening state to know what kind of government is
desired by the population of the other state. Furthermore, the very par-
ticipation of the intervening state in establishing a government casts
doubt on the claim that the government is really being established ac-
cording to the will of the population.
The anti-intervention provisions of the charters of the United Na-
tions,2°° and particularly of the Organization of American States,20'
would seem to preclude humanitarian intervention. In any event,
whatever its reasons for intervening in Panama, the United States did not
actually assert a humanitarian legal justification. 20 2
VII. Combatting Drug Trafficking
President Bush gave one further reason for the Panama action - "to
combat drug trafficking. o20 3 Secretary Baker elaborated, stating that one
"objective" was "to seize and arrest an indicted drug trafficker," a refer-
ence to General Noriega and his 1988 indictment in the United States on
drug trafficking charges.2°4 In August 1989, the Department of State
told the Organization of American States that General Noriega had
turned Panama into a "haven for drug traffickers." 20 5 The capture of
General Noriega was certainly a goal of the invasion; however, neither
197. This was the situation with the United States invasion of Grenada in 1983, in which
the United States acted for reasons related to world politics, not to prevent human rights
violations. Quigley, supra note 89, at 351-52. But see F. T s6N, supra note 192, at 197 (citing
invasion as example of humanitarian intervention); see also Dadrian, supra note 194, at 246-49
(discussing political dimension of humanitarian intervention in Ottoman Turkey).
198. See infra text accompanying notes 234-52.
199. See supra text accompanying note 192.
200. U.N. CHARTFR art. 2(4).
201. O.A.S. Charter, supra note 63, arts. 18, 20.
202. Legal Adviser Sofaer said that the objective of installing persons who had been
elected to administer Panama was relevant to the legality of the United States action, although
he did not say that it provided an independent legal justification. Remarks of Abraham Sofaer,
supra note 59.
203. A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama, supra note 44.
204. Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, supra note 53.
205. U.S. Renews Attack on Noriega, Offering Evidence of Ties to Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept.
1, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (address by Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger).
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President Bush nor Secretary Baker put it forward as a legal justification
for the action. This paper nevertheless will analyze the possible legal
basis of such a claim.
* International efforts to suppress drug trafficking have received increas-
ing attention in recent years. Although there is no universal jurisdiction
over drug trafficking as there is over piracy or genocide, 206 Panama and
the United States are both parties to the major multilateral convention
on suppression of drug trafficking. That agreement, the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs,207 requires prosecution of serious drug of-
fenses; 208 and although General Noriega's alleged acts were committed
outside the United States, the United States would have jurisdiction over
them if they had an effect inside the United States.20 9 While the United
States might thus have jurisdiction to prescribe 210 rules to curtail the fa-
cilitation of cocaine smuggling into its territory, it would not necessarily
have jurisdiction to enforce21' those rules. Generally, a state may not
engage in law enforcement activity in another state without its
consent. 212
Because drug trafficking is considered a matter of international con-
cern, states confer extensively with each other to coordinate efforts to
suppress the traffic in illegal drugs, both within the United Nations and
on a regional basis. They also collaborate on an operational basis in
sharing information and apprehending offenders. Yet neither the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs213 nor any other norms found in treaty or
customary law permit a state, in its anti-drug efforts, to violate the sover-
eignty of another state.
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)].
207. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No.
6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Single Convention]; see also Protocol Amending the Sin-
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118,
976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol Amending the Single Convention].
208. Protocol Amending the Single Convention, supra note 207, art. 14.
209. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191,204(1983); Conven-
tion Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, art. 4(l)(b)(iii), U.N.
Doe. E/CONF.82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (authorizing party state to
establish jurisdiction over drug trafficking offense committed outside its territory with intended
effects within its territory).
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 206, § 402. •
211. Id § 431.
212. Id § 433; see also Drug Plan Puts Stress on Reducing Demand, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1990, at A5, col. I (reporting U.N. General Assembly's Global Program of Action on drug
trafficking and Political Declaration calling on nations, in their anti-drug efforts, to respect
sovereignty of other states and principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states).
213. See supra note 207.
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The Department of Justice, however, has recently taken a position that
seems to justify the use of force to seize a person sought on drug charges
in the territory of another state, even without the consent of its govern-
ment. On November 3, 1989, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice
Department issued an opinion memorandum stating that the use of
United States military personnel to apprehend drug traffickers overseas
would not violate United States law. Titled "The Extraterritorial Effect
of the Posse Comitatus Act," the memorandum declared that the Posse
Comitatus Act,214 which prohibits the United States military from un-
dertaking law enforcement, does not apply outside the United States.2 15
Earlier in the year, on June 21, the Office of Legal Counsel had issued
another opinion memorandum that stated that the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and other United States law enforcement agencies were au-
thorized to seize criminal suspects in a foreign state without the consent
of that state.216 Some Administration officials viewed the two opinion
memoranda, taken together, as authorizing use of the military to seize
suspects abroad, even without the approval of the state in question;217 on
that understanding, some members of Congress criticized the two
memoranda.218
This interpretation of the two memoranda conflicts with the right of a
state to sovereignty over its territory. The Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States allows "[l]aw enforcement
officers of the United States (to] exercise their functions in the territory of
another state only with ... the consent of the other state. '219 Without
such consent, the arrest and abduction of foreign nationals abroad in-
fringes on the territorial rights of the host state and thus violates Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 220 Moreover, such actions poten-
214. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
215. U.S. Military Given Foreign Arrest Powers, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
The text of the memorandum has not been made public.
216. Id.
217. US Policy of Grinding Down Noriega Stalls, supra note 73 (U.S. officials claim right to
seize drug suspects from territory of foreign states). This view received some support from the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990). In
that case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant for a search
for evidence does not apply to the search by U.S. police officials of the residence abroad of a
foreign national. The warrant requirement, however, involves particular difficulties regarding
application abroad, since it is not clear that a U.S. magistrate has the authority to issue a
warrant for the search of premises in a foreign state. Concurring, Justice Kennedy noted that
a foreign national is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when tried
in a U.S. court. Id. at 1068.
218. U.S. Military Given Foreign Arrest Powers, supra note 215.
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 206, § 433.
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tially violate one or more of the following human rights of the suspect:
the right to personal integrity, the right to be detained only under legal
authority, the right to a prompt review of the lawfulness of a detention,
and the right to remain in a state until expelled by proper authority.221
Before the Justice Department issued the two opinion memoranda,
222
United States precedent did not favor jurisdiction over persons forcibly
arrested overseas without the consent of the territorial state and brought
into the United States for trial. In United States v. Toscanino, 223 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the
lawfulness of the abduction of the accused by foreign agents in Uruguay,
who allegedly acted on behalf of United States law enforcement officers.
It stated that such an abduction would violate the United States treaty
commitments, in both the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the
Organization of American States, to respect the territorial sovereignty of
Uruguay. The court first held that due process required "a court to
divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendent where it has
been acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary
and unreasonable invasion of the accused rights. ' 224 The court then
went on to say that no United States court has jurisdiction to prosecute a
person seized in violation of the sovereignty of another state.225
Although the usual rule regards as irrelevant the method by which an
accused was brought into the jurisdiction,226 the court in Toscanino de-
clared that this rule "does not apply where a defendant has been brought
into the district court's jurisdiction by forcible abduction in violation of a
treaty. ' 227 In support, the court cited the Eichmann Case,228 in which
Israel seized a suspect in Argentina without Argentina's consent. 229 The
221. Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights From Kid-
napping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HuM. RTs. Q. 199-205 (1988).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 214-18.
223. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
224. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The suspect was allegedly tortured by foreign police
agents, with the knowledge of the United States Attorney. This ground has been stressed by
commentators and by the Second Circuit itself in subsequent characterizations of the holding
of Toscanino. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, The Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Constitution - Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REv. 649, 668-69 (1986).
225. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277-79.
226. Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). But see
Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure orArrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J.
INT'L L. 231, 238 (1934) (criticizing Ker holding).
227. 500 F.2d at 278.
228. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusa-
lem 1961), aff'd, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962).
229. 500 F.2d at 277-78.
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United Nations Security Council found this action to violate Argentina's
sovereignty.
230
The prohibition against prosecution applies, in the Toscanino analysis,
only if the asylum state objects to the abduction;231 a subsequent case of
prosecution following forcible abduction restricted the prohibition to pre-
cisely such cases. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,232 the Second
Circuit found the failure of the host states (Argentina and Bolivia) to
object to the abduction "fatal to his [defendant's] reliance upon the char-
ters. ' 233 The circumstances of the Panama case cloud this issue some-
what, as the Noriega government considered the invasion to violate
Panamanian sovereignty, but the Endara government did not.
Even if international law recognized a right to seize a suspect in an-
other state without that state's consent, this right would not establish a
further right to invade the host state and overthrow its government in
order to seize the suspect. The infringement on the host state's sover-
eignty in this situation is even greater than in the seizure of a suspect
without an effort to defeat the armed forces of the state or to overthrow
its government. Thus, although the United States did not assert the aim
of capturing General Noriega as a legal justification for its invasion of
Panama, it would have provided only a tenuous legal basis for the
invasion.
VIII. Other Possible Motives for the Invasion
The invasion of Panama took place in a complex political climate that
made it difficult to determine with certainty the United States primary
motivation. Although none of the four objectives cited by the Bush Ad-
ministration justifies the United States action, they may have been rele-
vant as motives in the decision to invade Panama. While legally deficient
and perhaps specious, they certainly evoke principles that are difficult to
oppose: defense of citizens, protection of a major international asset,
promotion of democracy, combatting drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the
circumstances surrounding the invasion suggest that the United States
had other, less admirable goals which remained unstated.
One possible motive is retention of United States control over the Pan-
ama Canal. The Panama Canal Treaty called for the complete transfer
230. S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
231. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 282 (Anderson, J., concurring) ("By and large treaties are
to be enforced by governments, rather than by their individual citizens .. .
232. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
233. Id. at 67. The charters referred to are those of the Organization of American States
and the United Nations.
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of the Canal and the removal of all United States troops from Panama by
December 31, 1999, but that treaty was controversial in the United
States. When it was signed, many in Congress opposed it,234 and skepti-
cism as to the advisability of a pullout from Panama persisted.235 So long
as a strongly nationalist government, such as Noriega's government, was
in power in Panama, there was little chance of amending the Treaty. If
the Panamanian government were on close terms with the United States,
however, and particularly if its officials owed their positions to the
United States, there was a possibility of renegotiating the Panama Canal
Treaty to provide some role in Canal operations for the United States
into the twenty-first century and the continued deployment of military
forces in Panama.236 Throughout the episode, the United States denied
any intention of reneging on the two Canal treaties,237 but it never closed
the door to the possibility of renegotiation.
The United States was concerned about Panama's appointment of a
Canal Administrator due to take office on January 1, 1990.238 It had said
it would not accept any administrator named by Panama; its avowed
refusal to accept any Panamanian appointment violated its obligation
under the Panama Canal Treaty to appoint as administrator a Panama-
nian national proposed by Panama.239 The importance of the position lay
in the administrator's responsibility for operating the Canal, under
United States auspices, until December 31, 1999, when the United States
would cede all rights to Panama. The United States hoped for a smooth
transition to Panamanian control that would leave the Canal in good
operating order at the time of its withdrawal.
The United States refusal to accept any candidate for administrator
proposed by Panama also had important political ramifications, which
may well have outweighed any practical significance. President Bush
made his statement about the next administrator at the same time that he
rejected the legitimacy of a new president who had taken office with Gen-
eral Noriega's backing.2m° President Bush said that the United States
234. See, e.g., Senate Additions to the Panama Canal Treaties, 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 52-54
(May 1978) (series of conditions, reservations, and understandings placed by Senate on U.S.
ratification of Panama Canal Treaty and Neutrality Treaty).
235. Combat in Panama, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A9, col. 1 (notes controversial
nature of Panama Canal Treaty).
236. See Quayle Trip: Resentment Dramatized, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1990, at A16, col. 4
(noting possibility of renegotiation of Canal treaties).
237. See Combat in Panama, supra note 235 (Bush reaffirms commitment to implement
Panama Canal Treaty and to turn over Canal in year 2000).
238. See 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(3)(c).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.-
240. See Aide to Noriega Is Sworn In; U.S. Won't Recognize Him, supra note 29.
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would accept no "diplomatic correspondence" from the government of
Panama, including correspondence about the appointment of the Canal
administrator.241 Thus, the United States refusal to accept an administra-
tor appointed by the Noriega-led government was an additional means of
pressure designed to bring down that government. 242
A second point of contention in United States-Panama relations in-
volved cocaine trafficking. President Bush had declared a "war on
drugs" as a major policy priority.243 The "war on drugs" had registered
little success, as efforts to prevent cultivation in countries of origin and to
prevent smuggling into the United States had not achieved significant
results.244 Because Panama had become a transit point in shipments
from Colombia (a source of much of the cocaine) to the United States, 245
a decisive move against that transshipment might give life to the "war on
drugs."
The Bush Administration also had reason to be concerned about Gen-
eral Noriega's knowledge and possible revelations of a United States role
in the drug trafficking. As a covert means of providing revenue to the
contra rebels in Nicaragua, the Central Intelligence Agency had ar-
ranged the shipment of cocaine and marijuana to the United States on
the return legs of aerial supply flights to the contras.246 The Agency did
not acknowledge this drug trafficking, but General Noriega may have
known of it, because he was involved both in drug operations and in
aiding the contras.247
The drug trafficking situation was relevant to the invasion in one other
respect. The United States was interested in taking a more active role,
241. Id
242. Pearson, Panama, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 70 (discussing refusal to accept
nominee for Administrator as part of U.S. pressure to remove Noriega-led government).
243. Bush Endorses Outline of Planfor Drug Battle, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at Al, col.
5.
244. Wrobleski, Presidential Certification of Narcotics Source Countries, 88 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 47 (June 1988).
245. Id at 50.
246. L. COCKBURN, OUT OF CONTROL 152-88 (1987); Contra Arms Crews Said to Smuggle
Drugs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 4 (D.E.A. agents say pilots taking arms to
contras brought drugs back on return flights; pilots claim they had White House protection).
247. Money Courier Tells of Services for CIA, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 16, 1987, at 3,
col. 2 (Cuban accountant Ram6n Milian Rodriguez, convicted of cocaine possession and drug-
money laundering, testifies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Terror-
ism, Narcotics, and International Operations that he delivered to Gen. Noriega money from
both C.I.A. and Colombian drug cartel); Smuggler Ties Contras to U.S. Drug Network, N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1987, at A13, col. 5 (George Morales, convidted of drug smuggling, testifies to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna-
tional Operations that he directed pilots who flew arms to contras from southern Florida and
brought cocaine and marijuana back on return trips; operation alleged to have protection of
C.I.A.).
Vol. 15:276, 1990
U.S. Invasion of Panama
including a military role, in suppressing the drug deliveries coming out of
Colombia. It had already sent some military personnel to Colombia for
that purpose. Shortly after invading Panama, it sent ships to cruise off
the coast of Colombia. The establishment of nearby Panama as a
friendly state facilitated this activity. The use of troops in Panama may
have been part of the effort to increase the role of the military in anti-
drug operations.248
A third factor that may have influenced the United States decision to
invade Panama was the longstanding military hostilities in Central
America. The Bush Administration, like its predecessor, assumed an ad-
versarial position towards the government of Nicaragua, financing the
contra military opposition and maintaining economic sanctions that se-
verely hamstrung Nicaragua's economy. The Administration may have
thought that an invasion of a nearby state would provide an object lesson
to Nicaragua. With elections in Nicaragua scheduled for February 1990,
the Administration may have hoped that an invasion of Panama would
show the people of Nicaragua the risks run by a Central American state
in opposing the United States, thus convincing them to vote for a candi-
date who would establish close relations with the United States. The
ultimate success of the anti-Sandinista coalition in the February 1990
elections may have been due in part to concern by Nicaraguan voters
that retaining a government that was on hostile terms with the United
States would mean continued military and economic pressure from the
United States.249
A fourth factor that may have played a role in the invasion was the
international balance of forces. "Robbed of a plausible threat in the
shape of. the Evil Empire,250 the United States Defence Department
needs new enemies to take on," wrote the London Economist,, "Who
better than beastly drug runners like General Noriega?' 251 With the per-
ceived threat to the United States from the Eastern Bloc diminishing,
military planners in the United States were under pressure to justify the
existing level of armaments and armed forces, which had risen dramati-
cally during the 1980s. The suspicion that the Panama invasion may
have been staged, in part, to prove the need for military expenditures was
enhanced by the fact that all the military services found a role in the
248. U.S. to Unveil Drug Plan; Big Army Role Seen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, at A5, col.
1.
249. Nicaraguan Opposition Routs Sandinistas; U.S. Pledges Aid, Tied to Orderly Turnover,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
250. A reference to the term President Ronald Reagan used to characterize the U.S.S.R.
251. A man, a plan, a canal, Panama, supra note 18, at 17.
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Neither of the two bases the United States asserted to justify its inva-
sion of Panama is adequate. Each falls short of providing a justification
under applicable principles of international law. The self-defense claim
fails because the United States did not demonstrate that Panama had
attacked the United States or was about to do so. The claim based on the
Panama Canal treaties of 1977 fails because the treaties do not give the
United States a right to intervene against Panama, and even if they did,
Panama had not threatened the Canal's operation.
The justifications asserted by United States found scant support in the
international community, which widely criticized the invasion of Panama
as a violation of international law.253 By a vote of twenty to one - the
sole negative vote being that of the United States2 54 - the Organization
of American States adopted a resolution which said that members
"deeply regret" the invasion,25 5 called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces,
and supported "the right of the Panamanian people to self-determination
without outside interference. ' 25 6 The O.A.S. condemned the invasion de-
spite its previous criticism of General Noriega and its efforts to convince
him to give up power.257
In the United Nations Security Council, a majority voted for a draft
resolution declaring that the intervention violated international law,
though vetoes by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
252. Id at 18 (stating that use of stealth aircraft "reinforced the impression that the Penta-
gon is treating Panama as a playground in which to practise its new arts"); Panama Alerted to
Attack, General Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A7, col. I (report by Lt. Gen. Carl Stiner,
U.S. Army, says that six stealth fighters were used, rather than only two as originally re-
ported); Stealth Fighter's Mission Reported Marred by Error, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at A1,
col. 2 (critics of Pentagon charge that it used stealth aircraft in Panama to "buttress the case
for buying" them, in face of Congressional opposition because of high cost).
253. World Criticism of U.S. Intervention Mounts, supra note 188; U.S. Cites Self-Defense;
Legal Scholars Skeptical, supra note 1; Generalizada condena a la interencidn estadounidense,
La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Dec. 22, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
254. O.A.S. Votes to Censure U.S. for Intervention, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1989, at A7, col.
5; Criticism of U.S. Action Is Supported in 20-1 Vote, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15, col. 5.
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Antigua, and Barbados abstained.
255. "Deplore" in the Spanish-language text. La OEA deplora la invasidn y exige un cese
delfuego, La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Dec. 23, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
256. Criticism of US. Action Is Supported in 20-1 Vote, supra note 254.
257. O.A.S. Draws Latin Fire for Stand on Panama, supra note 25; Latin Envoys Report No
Progress in Their Effort to Dislodge Noriega, supra note 25; Diplomats Urge Noriega to Resign
by Sept 1, supra note 25; Diplomacy: Haunting Noriega Issue Stirs Great Hope and Low
Expectation as.O.A.S. Meets Again, supra note 25; U.S. Is Faulted on Military Maneuvers in
Panama, supra note 25.
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killed the resolution.258 The United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution, 75-20, to "strongly deplore" the intervention and to demand
the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Panama.
259
Clearly, the majority of states considered the action to be unlawful.
It is fortunate, in the interest of maintaining standards that protect
states from attack, that the states represented in the Organization of
American States and the United Nations reacted so strongly to the inva-
sion and rejected the United States claims of justification. In particular,
the United States claim of self-defense reflects the continuation of a dan-
gerous doctrine expanding that concept. Since the mid-1980s, the United
States has advocated a position that (1) holds that an attack on civilians
is an attack on their state; (2) does not require imminence to an attack
anticipated from the target state; (3) does not require the intervening
state to prove that an attack would occur; and (4) ignores the require-
ment of proportionality in the use of responsive force. Acceptance of the
United States application of this expansive doctrine to its claim of self-
defense in Panama would permit states to use the claim of self-defense as
a justification for unlawful use of force.
Finally, the invasion of Panama was even more unfortunate because it
occurred in a period in which superpower tension has eased, reducing
military conflict in the developing world. For the past several decades
the United States had claimed that East-West confrontation provided a
political justification for its military interventions in Central America.
But military interventionism by the United States in Central America
antedated the East-West contention, and the Panama invasion demon-
strated that it has outlived it.
258. Two Delegates Vying to Be the Voice of the New Government, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1989, at A12, col. 3.
259. U.N. Assembly Blasts Invasion ofPanama, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
Some European delegates who voted in the negative explained that their yote did not indicate
support for the legality of the invasion, but said that they had wanted the resolution to mention
misdeeds by Gen. Noriega. Id
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